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# Review of National Intelligence

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for the Director of Central Intelligence*

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# Review of National Intelligence

Vol. 2 No. 1

Prepared by the Product Assessment and Improvement Division,  
Intelligence Community Staff, for the  
Director of Central Intelligence

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## PREFACE

*This will be the last issue of the RONI. The recent establishment of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the steadily increasing emphasis of the Director of Central Intelligence on his Community responsibilities have placed heavy new burdens on the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community and upon the Intelligence Community Staff. These burdens are concentrated in supporting the DCI, the D/DCI/IC, and the CFI in identifying, analyzing, and resolving critical issues relating to the allocation and management of resources within the Community.*

*Assessing the quality and relevance of Intelligence Community production will continue to be a most vital part of this job. It will continue to be performed by the Production Assessment and Improvement Division of the Intelligence Community Staff, now lodged along with divisions concerned with collection, in the Office of Performance Evaluation and Improvement. But we shall have to place greater emphasis on performance assessment that comprehends the entire intelligence process, from program inception through requirements definition, collection, information processing, analysis, and production, to impact on national policy. To do this job well even on selected major issues will be an enormous task. It does not appear that our manpower will allow substantive review of national intelligence for these purposes to be efficiently accomplished and effectively communicated through a journal like the RONI. The reader will note that this issue of the RONI itself displays much more attention to matters of Community activity and process than have previous issues.*

*The RONI helped to cultivate a self-critical spirit within the Intelligence Community. Its many authors and contributors are to be commended for their efforts. This office will enlarge on those efforts in future product and performance assessment projects.*

*Director, Office of Performance  
Evaluation and Improvement,  
Intelligence Community Staff*

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# I. Matters of General Interest

## Community Principles

The Director of Central Intelligence has set forth a number of principles intended to guide the activities of all elements of the US Foreign Intelligence Community. As presented in a memorandum he sent to the National Foreign Intelligence Board in May, these principles are:

1. Total objectivity is the hallmark of all intelligence reports and estimates.
2. Strongly held dissents and differing judgments within the Intelligence Community will be carefully noted in Community-coordinated products forwarded to policymaking levels of the Government.
3. Representatives of every Community organization must have the right to be heard and to have their ideas and views given serious consideration.
4. The freest possible flow of information, both within and among the organizations of the Community, and with the users of intelligence is the constant goal. To assure that the fullest data is available, cooperative arrangements must be maintained with all Government agencies working in the foreign affairs field.
5. We have an obligation to provide as much information as possible on an unclassified basis, but without derogation of the necessity to protect sensitive sources and methods and to protect information which truly requires sensitive treatment.
6. Dependable intelligence is an essential base for the formulation of national policy so intelligence collection and production must give priority to topics of major policy concern. Our role is to provide information and professional judgments on foreign developments, without coloration by policy considerations.
7. The concept of an Intelligence Community must be strengthened. We will be judged on Community accomplishments and on the effectiveness of our interaction in Community problems as well as on our substantive end products.
8. Continuing attention will be given to improving the interface between national and tactical intelligence capabilities, seeking to capitalize on the potentiality of inputs to national intelligence needs from tactical resources in peacetime and the capabilities of national resources to provide intelligence of import to both peacetime force readiness and wartime operations.
9. The Community must be action oriented and responsive. Papers must move quickly, deadlines must be met, decisions must be reached and results must be demonstrated.
10. The limitations and restrictions on intelligence activities already set by the President will be rigidly observed and have the full support of all intelligence personnel, in spirit as well as act.
11. Improvement of the public perception of U.S. intelligence will be given continuing attention. Intelligence is a profession in which pride can be taken and that pride should be demonstrated. Within the constraints of legitimate security requirements, the Intelligence Community should strive to better public understanding of our mission and of our product.
12. The Intelligence Community should be as responsive as possible to Congressional inquiries. Congressional support is essential to sustain the effectiveness of the US intelligence effort, and our cooperation is essential to such support.

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## The Practice of Intelligence Analysis

CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence last year invited intelligence officers to a seminar on the practice of intelligence analysis. This session led to some challenging observations and, at least from the point of view of working analysts, some real wisdom as well. Those at the seminar, for example, generally agreed that:

- The "management" of analysis is a key element in the intelligence process; it needs additional consideration and effort at improvement.
- The Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) and the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP) is too cumbersome, static, and time-consuming to be of much help in the effort to improve the analytic product.
- Intelligence analysis has been the stepchild over the years in CIA's budget, but this is now changing.

And one of the principal speakers at the seminar observed that:

- The role of the analyst has important aspects apart from the analytic process itself: living with the bureaucracy, consultation with fellow professionals, and repetitive presentations of analysis in the form of briefings, NSSM inputs, and the like. It is in part the burden imposed by duties such as these that set up a problem facing the analytic staffs: that of providing a suitable environment for analysts, including sufficient working time (away, from the meeting and consultation circuit) for the conduct of real analysis.
- In the area of estimative intelligence, analysts in the main proceed by extrapolation from present trends. The trouble with this is not that such extrapolation is mostly wrong. On the contrary, it is mostly right. Analysts thus tend to become its prisoner, and this sometimes leads to gross and damaging misjudgments (cf., those made in September 1973 concerning the likelihood of war in the Middle East). Any really expert analysis must devote a disproportionately large

amount of attention to the prospect for change and to the offbeat theory, so as to maximize the ability to capture discontinuity and change.

For more on the work of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, see the article in Part IV, "Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security Policy Making," which begins on p. 27.

## A National Sitrep

Representatives of the principal producing agencies in the Community recently agreed on general procedures for the issuance of a *national* intelligence situation report during crises, this to be delivered to very high-level consumers in lieu of the three or four discrete sitreps that reached these consumers in the past. Specifically, under the auspices of the DCI, the Community's principal producing agencies (CIA, DIA, State/INR, and NSA) will, when international events and the needs of the NSC and its staff so demand, cooperate in the preparation of an all-source *national* intelligence sitrep which will reflect Community views and clarify any important Community disagreements over substance.

The DCI will assume responsibility within the Community for deciding when and by whom a national sitrep should be produced. Normally, he will designate one Community component to act as his executive agent and assume primary responsibility for production and, more often than not, this is likely to be CIA. There will be times, however, when the nature of a particular crisis—e.g., the Mayaguez incident—may prompt him to name some other agency, such as DIA.

In any event, each of the major producing agencies will offer various forms of assistance to the task force assembled by the producer: the provision of analysts to be incorporated into the task force and/or officers serving with the task force in a liaison role, the submission of written contributions to the publication itself, and the extension of special support in the area of collection tasking and response.

### DIA's Experiment with Uncertainty

Last January DIA initiated an experiment designed to achieve more precise statements of the confidence and probability of intelligence judgments. This experiment received its initial impulse from high-level DOD consumers—principally Deputy Secretary Ellsworth—who have repeatedly indicated dissatisfaction with vague language of the “it is believed . . .” or “hostilities possibly will . . .” character.

The trial run involved the incorporation of both percentages (e.g., 30%, 50%, 90%) and letters (A, B and C) in the texts of selected Defense Intelligence Notices (DINs) and Defense Intelligence Appraisals. The percentages reflected the probability that a given judgment was valid; the letters represented the analyst's confidence in the source material: A=high confidence; B=medium; C=low.

At the end of the trial period 750 readers of the DINs were asked about the usefulness of the experiment; 128 responses were received from a broad spectrum of DOD consumers. A majority favored the use of quantified expressions of probability, believing that they helped to increase their confidence in the information provided and in DIA's judgment and, in particular, helped to give greater credibility to briefings based on the DIA material.\* There was,

\*Several analysts involved in the experiment, however, have warned that the statement of percentages could convey to at least some readers a degree of precision not justified by the data at hand or the subjective nature of an analyst's “hunch” regarding future events.

however, little enthusiasm for the alphabetized expressions of confidence in sources. There were a few votes for putting the numerical and alphabetical statements at the end of an article so that the text would read more smoothly. The respondents as a group indicated that the expressions of uncertainty would be most useful in current intelligence, somewhat less so in estimative intelligence, and of least value in basic intelligence.

DIA recently decided on the basis of this survey to quantify the probability (in percentages) of all major judgments and projections in the DINs but to drop the alphabetized evaluation of sources. It also decided to experiment with similar procedures for selected order of battle products and Defense Intelligence Estimates.

Courses for DIA personnel in the assessment and expression of uncertainty are now being initiated by both the Defense Intelligence School and the Intelligence Community's Information Science Center, located in CIA's Office of Training. This training, covering both theory and practice, is intended to provide analysts and supervisors with greater confidence and consistency in the use of expressions of uncertainty.

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## II. Specific Commentaries

### Military Intelligence

#### *The Warsaw Pact NIE: Critics, Consumers, and ICS Conclusions*

There has been considerable discussion generated about the substance and format of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-75, "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," since its publication in September 1975. Several elements in offices of Assistant Secretaries of Defense (OASD) have been the most vocal critics of the NIE. This article will summarize the basic issues involved in the discussion, outline the results of an informal survey of the reactions to the NIE by principal consumers outside of OASD and, finally, discuss some "lessons learned" as they might apply to future military estimates.

### Controversy

NIE 11-14-75 concerns itself with the Warsaw Pact forces—primarily ground and tactical air forces—located in the European USSR and Eastern Europe opposite NATO—and updates its predecessor estimate, which was issued in 1971. The criticisms of the current NIE raise issues in four general categories:

- Scope and Format.* Is the Estimate too narrow in scope and too sparing in the detail it provides?
- Omissions.* Does the NIE talk around, or fail completely to address, a number of major issues?
- Evidence and Supporting Rationale.* Are suitable rationales for its principal judgments lacking, and are some judgments offered without any supporting evidence?
- Uncertainties and Data Limitations.* Does the NIE make uncritical use of Soviet exercise data which are susceptible to misinterpretation? Does it fail to express the uncertainties inherent in exercises which form the basis of many of its key judgments?

With regard to scope and format, it was agreed by the NIO and the other representatives of the agencies participating in the NIE's development that it would highlight those major issues on which either significant new information indicated that previous judgments should be modified or on which substantial new work had been accomplished by the Community, but that the NIE should not devote much space to other issues. Based on a recommendation by the Director, DIA, the decision was also made to limit severely the length of the Estimate and rely on other coordinated intelligence publications (e.g., MC-161-76 and Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning) to provide more comprehensive documentation relevant to the NIE's analyses.\* The rationale for producing such a "short and to-the-point" Estimate was that the paper's intended audience was primarily the most senior governmental policymakers.

There has been no argument about the need for detailed force data tables/projections or extensive treatment of such significant topics as Warsaw Pact combat effectiveness, warning (surprise attack) in Europe, the role of tactical air, developments in the Western Military Districts, Warsaw Pact command and control, Pact buildup and logistics capabilities, etc. The question is to what degree these subjects should have been thoroughly examined in the NIE, or Annexes thereto, rather than in other intelligence issuances. From the OASD standpoint, the answer now seems to be: "to the maximum degree."

The second related area of general concern is the question of whether NIE 11-14-75 failed completely to address, or "papered over" a number of major issues. On this point, a comparative reading of the 1971 and 1975

\*The current estimate contains, therefore, only four tables of supporting data and nine figures, whereas the 1971 version had over 30 tables, plus numerous figures and maps.

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Estimates shows that only two major substantive topics were discussed in 1971 that do not appear in the current paper. (These topics—general purpose naval forces and forces on the Soviet-SINO border—are now the subject of other NIEs and are so referenced in NIE 11-14-75.) As noted earlier, however, the limited treatment some of these subjects receive in this particular NIE is the essential point at issue.

Additionally, the fact that only one major dissenting footnote appears in the document has been used to characterize the NIE as a "consensus" Estimate which has allegedly skirted contentious issues. This has been vigorously denied by the participants, who assert that no serious disagreements were encountered during the preparation of the NIE and in no case were any disagreements papered over.

The third general charge, that the Estimate offers too little in the way of supporting rationales and evidence for its analyses and judgments, turns on the question of how much source information should properly be included in an NIE. In the case of NIE 11-14-75, the level of supporting detail varied because it was determined by considerations of length and, more important, security classification. Certain users—particularly in OASD—strongly believe that all supporting rationale and evidence should be presented in as much detail as possible, particularly when significant new judgments about shifts in Warsaw Pact concepts, plans, and capabilities are being discussed.

The final, closely related area of controversy concerns the extent to which the NIE's analysis (1) reflects an uncritical or even superficial use of Soviet exercise data which are susceptible to misinterpretation, and (2) fails to express the uncertainties inherent in exercise data exploitation. Critics have called for clarification of the evidence for the Estimate's major judgments pertaining to Soviet concepts for the initial employment of Pact forces and the question of the timing of reinforcements from the USSR. The critics have implied that these judgments are based exclusively on Pact exercise activities (which can be used simply to test new concepts and do not necessarily reflect current

plans or the private perceptions of Soviet leaders).\*

### A Consumer Survey

These, then, are the basic issues pertaining to NIE 11-14-75 which have developed from the dialogue between the drafters of the Estimate and consumers (and critics) in OASD. In order to assess the reaction to this Estimate of other major consumers, an informal survey was conducted in March 1976 by members of the Intelligence Community Staff. Contact was made with some thirty consumers in the NSC Staff, Department of State, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman's Staff Group; Office of Director, Joint Staff; J-5; and SAGA), OMB, DDR&E, and ACDA. Again, in order of the identified issues, the reactions of these readers can be summarized as follows:

- Users at the NSC Staff, State and DDR&E felt that NIE 11-14-75 suffered from insufficient documentaiton of force data and supporting analyses and considered its predecessor Estimate vastly superior in scope and format. On the other hand, certain consumers in OJCS and OMB found the compactness of the current Estimate to their liking and thought that detailed annexes were neither required nor desired.
- Those contacted were apparently not bothered by the lack of more dissenting footnotes in NIE 11-14-75. There was, however, general agreement among most consumers that the Estimate should have covered in somewhat greater detail (or with more clarity) certain major issues. The three

\*In this regard, the NIE states that "we do not have access to the Soviets' war plans but we can infer the general nature of their military contingency plans from the information available from Warsaw Pact military exercises, from Pact writings on military strategy and tactics for war with NATO, and from the current disposition of Pact forces." Moreover, to the degree that exercise data were used in the NIE's analysis, the activities in question are asserted to be "recurring themes" that have been "consistently exhibited" in exercises "since the late 60's." Finally, the NIE explicitly acknowledges that what is seen in exercises may differ substantially from the private perceptions of Soviet leaders. Since these private perceptions cannot be divined, the NIE tries simply to identify the Soviet military's planning perspectives for the contingency which the military regards as most likely in the event of war in Central Europe.

most frequently named were: force effectiveness, warning, and the Pact tactical air offensive scenario. There was also some expression of the viewpoint that the current Estimate's treatment of force trends was weak and poorly presented.

- The issue of whether the Estimate's principal judgments were suitably supported was not a particularly bothersome one to most of the consumers contacted, with the notable exception of OMB representatives who argued that more evidence should have been cited and discussed.
- The NIE's use of source data and the degree to which it expressed uncertainties did not pose any significant problems or raise any serious questions for most of the consumers contacted, although OMB representatives suggested that a section containing "Comments on Intelligence Sources and Gaps" would have been helpful.
- Some of those interviewed at the NSC Staff and OMB lamented the lack of their organizations' participation in the early stages of an estimate's development. They felt that direct, systematic involvement by more users in the Terms of Reference process would be desirable; they also suggested the creation of regular means for user responses following the estimate's publication.

The reaction to, and use of NIE 11-14-75 in the OJCS arena calls for additional comment. It is clear that the Estimate has received exposure at the most senior military levels (as well as at OSD, State, and the NSC).<sup>\*</sup> It is also apparent that no significant problems were raised at OJCS by the Estimate's scope, format, or whatever. Among those who read it, the NIE was characterized as "good, short, and to the point"; a "useful background document for concepts papers"; a "helpful addition to the general body of knowledge" on the subject; and a "fine starting point for establishing perspectives on future studies."

<sup>\*</sup>On this point, while the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently did not read NIE 11-14-75, they were made fully aware of the issues and policy implications therein.

The degree to which the "national intelligence" contained in the Estimate has actually been "used" in the JCS arena is, however, another issue. There is, for example, the nagging question of whether NIE 11-14 would have received high-level exposure at OJCS had it not previously generated controversy among OASD elements. Moreover, several senior officers in the Strategy Division (J-5) stated that the NIE was, in fact, not used at all in their routine business because they had to rely on the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP)\* or used only what DIA provided. Others in pertinent branches of the European Division (J-5) stated that they had not seen the Estimate before they specifically requested it (in response to this survey). As it turned out, several of these officers said the Estimate could have been useful for projects they had earlier completed.

A related factor that affects the degree to which NIE 11-14-75 was exposed and used at OJCS (and elsewhere) is the document's security classification. While this Estimate has been universally complimented for its incorporation of all-source data and its dissemination at a level of classification which permitted wider distribution than certain previous estimates, some consumers urge that the Estimate (or a sanitized supplement, as per NIE 11-14-71) be issued at the SECRET/TOP SECRET level to facilitate its accessibility still further.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

What are the principal "lessons learned" from the foregoing as they may apply to future NIEs? The first seems to be to reaffirm that no single NIE can be all things to all people. Certain consumers expect an estimate to serve both the policy maker and his staff by containing (as did NIE 11-14-71) an easy-to-read narrative summary of highlights, plus detailed annexes with force data tables/charts/projections and supporting analyses. These consumers look for a single publication (i.e., a "handbook") that can, to the maximum possible extent, answer all their questions on a given subject, be the agreed

<sup>\*</sup>The JIEP is an annual JCS publication which, insofar as it addresses material presented in NIEs, must agree with the NIEs. It need not, however, cover all the same issues or limit itself to issues raised in the NIEs.

reference for all pertinent force statistics, and, accordingly, minimize the problems involved in acquiring and researching other source documents for related information. On the other hand, some consumers prefer an NIE that is short, to-the-point, deals primarily with significant new issues and limits itself to an exposition of the Community's best judgments on a given subject area (as did NIE 11-14-75). Similarly, with regard to citing evidence and supporting rationales and detailing uncertainties and data limitations in an estimate's judgments, certain consumers expect an exhaustive accounting of these factors, while others seem content simply to receive the judgments themselves.

Based on the consumer reactions to NIE 11-14-75 outlined above, however, the experience with this particular paper did uncover several points of some consequence that could be of relevance to any future military NIE:

- Many consumers outside of the Intelligence Community have, for a variety of reasons, considerable difficulty (and display some reluctance?) in acquiring and using other intelligence source publications to answer questions or gain force data information not answered or reflected in the NIE itself. Hence, if the Estimate is not to be formatted as a full-blown "handbook" of all relevant data and analyses, it perhaps should provide an annotated bibliography of source documents (keyed to the various paragraphs of the NIE) where the consumer could readily find in-depth treatment of the issues in question.
- Moreover, if the Estimate is to include only a minimum amount of force data tables and supporting analyses—relying on the availability of this information in other coordinated intelligence publications—concerted efforts should be made to insure

the timely completion by the Community of all such documentation necessary to support fully the Estimate's principal judgments. (Analyses on certain major topics related to NIE 11-14-75 were to have been contained in a coordinated US version of MC-161-76. However, this document has not yet been completed.)

- A format which incorporated the following two suggestions would, in our view and in the view of several of those we consulted, enhance the value of a military NIE to the principal consumers: (1) A short "Summary and Conclusions" section with each major paragraph annotated with the paragraph number(s) in the main body of the Estimate where the summarized point/issue is discussed; and (2) a well-developed "Force Trends" section that cogently summarizes at the outset of the Estimate "what's new" regarding the pertinent force's doctrine, posture, capabilities, etc. since the preceding Estimate.
- Consideration should also be given to producing a sanitized supplement to the NIE at the non-codeword security classification level in order to broaden/facilitate consumer access to the Estimate's major themes.

As a final point, we would urge that, following the completion of major military papers, an NIE "Briefing Team" be organized to "get the message" of the Estimate out to as many consumers as possible. Such a procedure might, in addition, stimulate a timely and continuing exchange of informed views on the subject throughout the producer-user Community.

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## S&T Intelligence

### *Recent Studies from STIC*

During 1975, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC) of USIB published three studies which were particularly well received by a wide range of consumers. These three dealt with issues associated with the transfer of Western technology to the USSR; matters of current priorities for the producers of S&T intelligence; and areas of science and technology which may be of comparable concern in the future. The discussion below suggests why these studies were made, provides a summary of the more important findings, describes the overall reactions of consumers, and, where appropriate, identifies the actions STIC has undertaken in response.

### Technology Transfer

*Military Implications of Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union* examines specific areas of Western technology which, if acquired by the USSR, might benefit Soviet military capabilities.\* STIC set up an interagency working group (consisting of members from CIA, DIA, NSA, State, the three Services, ERDA, and Commerce) to draw together and assess information available within the Intelligence Community on this topic. This group focused its attention on four advanced technology areas—transport aircraft, semiconductors, digital computers, and air traffic control systems—of special interest to the Soviets. Unrestricted technology transfer in these particular areas offers the Soviets a potential for significant military gains.

By the end of March 1975, the working group completed its study. The overall conclusion, not suprisingly, was that the cumulative effect of growing technology transfer from the West (US, Canada, Japan, and Western Europe) will result in some selective improvements in the Soviet

\**Military Implications of Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union*, SIC-75/1, April 1975, S/NFD.

military posture over the next five to ten years. The rate and degree of improvement, however, could not be determined confidently because of the multiplicity of countries which could supply the technology and the uncertainty about Soviet capabilities and intentions to adopt the technology for military purposes.

The main value of the report comes from the side-by-side comparisons of US and Soviet technology in the areas selected for study. For example, in the transport aircraft section of the report, the discussion includes the relative standings of the US and USSR in many aspects of engine, avionics, and airframe production technology; an assessment of Soviet deficiencies and the factors causing them; and Soviet attempts to acquire foreign technology and the potential gains to the Soviet military from such acquisition. This type of discussion, relatively thorough in detail, provides useful insights into Soviet shortcomings in production and management techniques.

The report has been disseminated to a wide audience within the Intelligence Community and to high-level consumers in the Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense, and the National Science Foundation. Comments from many consumers have been uniformly complimentary, attesting to the value of two significant features—the high quality of the report itself and the appetite among certain consumers for technology-by-technology assessments by the Intelligence Community.

STIC has organized a working group to follow up with more of these studies. The four technologies discussed in this paper are being updated to reflect current Soviet capabilities and activities. Also, four additional areas—superconducting technology, signal processing technology, precision machine tools, and micro-circuitry manufacturing and testing technology—are being reviewed for their military implications.

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## Intelligence Priorities

STIC's second report, *Intelligence Priorities for the Sciences and Technologies*, is a display list which identifies those areas of most significance to national intelligence.\* STIC hopes that the highlighting of these areas will be helpful to management in its deliberations over the apportionment of resources for collection and production.

The display itself consists of three priority groupings, each containing a list of S&T areas and sub-areas felt by STIC to be of greatest significance within the groups. A majority of STIC member agencies agreed upon the relative ordering of the priority groups and issues. The selection and ranking criteria attempted to transcend individual organizational interests so that truly national concerns were represented. Various national intelligence guidance documents, including DCID 1/2—US Intelligence Objectives and Priorities—and the IQ program, were taken into account.

This STIC document, too, was distributed fairly widely, but primarily to various organizations and individuals within the Intelligence Community (or closely related to it). The response has been highly favorable. STIC's identification of areas in S&T intelligence which are of highest significance serves a twofold purpose. First, such a listing gives consumers who do not follow S&T matters daily an idea of what issues currently enjoy national level interest. Second, and more important, the interagency exercise of determining relative priorities—always a fun game—forces S&T intelligence elements to look critically at the balance of effort between national and organizational priorities. This in itself increases communications among the S&T intelligence collectors, producers, and consumers.

As can be expected, there was some dissatisfaction with the final groupings of priorities. Certain agencies felt that particular areas or sub-areas in the lower priority groupings deserved a higher ranking (especially if the agencies concerned were expending considerable

time and effort on the so-called lower priority items).

When STIC decided to coordinate and publish this study, there was agreement that the priority groupings would be updated when necessary to reflect changes in national S&T priorities. Although the priority areas are not so dynamic as to require an annual revision, the discussion engendered by the publication of this document has pointed out the necessity for a refined priority list. A STIC subcommittee has taken the initial steps to update the priority display. We recommend that the revised display include a short explanation of why particular S&T areas or sub-areas are placed in one or another priority grouping.

Following up on the priorities display, STIC has completed a preliminary study of the relative resource expenditures by various agencies for the production of finished intelligence on the sciences and technologies listed in all three priority groups. Despite serious difficulties attending the effort, STIC found that for the most part those areas enjoying Priority Group I ranking also enjoyed the expenditure of a higher percentage of production effort by the Intelligence Community. STIC is also preparing an analogous study of the utility and adequacy of collection assets being applied to the higher priority groupings.

## Emerging Technologies

The publication on the priorities for the sciences and technologies discussed above identified those areas of significance to national intelligence today. A third STIC publication, *Views on Emerging Areas of Science and Technology Potentially Important to National Security*, concerns the early recognition of advances in those sciences and technologies which are now emerging but whose full impact on the military and economic security of the US may not be appreciated for several years.\*

Two main factors underline this concern for our ability to identify S&T areas of particular significance in the future. One is that if these

\**Intelligence Priorities for the Sciences and Technologies*, STIC 75-3, September 1975, C.

\**Views on Emerging Areas of Science and Technology Potentially Important to National Security*, STIC 75-4, December 1975, C.

areas are recognized early enough, the Intelligence Community will find it easier to collect and analyze useful information while such information is still relatively easy to obtain. The other simply reflects everyone's awareness of the need to keep a close eye on developments in science and technology which hold the promise of surprising us in the future, if exploited by other countries.

STIC's part in adding to the useful literature on future technologies has been a major project whose goal is to stimulate early planning for future collection and analysis of new and unusual intelligence targets. The "Emerging Areas" report is the result of the first phase of the project. Between 15 and 20 scientists and engineers—all renowned figures in their respective fields, including two Nobel Prize winners and some former and current Defense and Intelligence Community contractors—were interviewed for their views on areas of science and technology particularly important to the military or economic security of the US in the 1980's. Care was taken during the interviews and the interpretations of results to minimize possible biases which could distort the results.

Specific areas which received considerable attention from the respondents included the biological sciences, computer sciences (especially inexpensive, but complex computer systems), novel energy sources, and laser technology. The interviews also revealed a concern for more general threats, such as economic warfare, weather/climate control, and nuclear proliferation. And one of the more fascinating overall results of the study was the weight of opinion that tomorrow's surprises will come in the life sciences, in such areas as genetic engineering and understanding the brain and the nature of thought. The potential importance of

the life sciences to national security apparently transcended the individual specialties of those interviewed, few of whom specialize in any of the biological fields.

This STIC product, too, has been well received by the Intelligence Community and its consumers. Like the report on S&T intelligence priorities, it is both informative and thought-provoking. The results represent the subjective judgments of those interviewed as well as those interpreting the responses. Thus, areas of and opportunities for disagreement abound. Once again, consumer comments have included the general concern that, "Yes, that area is important, but this one can be even more so."

STIC is following up this part of the project with a second set of interviews. During the second phase, additional scientists and engineers, those whose backgrounds represent an even broader spectrum of skills and expertise, are being contacted. The results of both sets of interviews will be combined, and STIC expects to be able to make some additional recommendations which will deserve scrutiny in the future.

The importance of many of these areas of concern is now only beginning to emerge. Persuading the Intelligence Community to expend time, money, and effort on areas which are not of immediate or near-term interest has, historically, been difficult. Some of these concerns may seem to be "way out," the consequence of an overactive scientific imagination. But so were thoughts of ICBMs and lasers not too many years ago. ( )

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## Political Intelligence

### *Presenting Political Research: A Case Study*

CIA's Office of Political Research has produced a study on Ukrainian nationalism which deserves attention both for its format and its substance.

#### *"Nationalism in the Soviet Ukraine"—The Intelligence Contribution*

This study was issued in two versions: a TOP SECRET Codeword, 45-page, single-space published edition with specific citations to supporting documents; and a much shorter version—a 16-page, double-space executive summary—at the CONFIDENTIAL level.\* The former was clearly aimed at those policy staffers and intelligence analysts with time for and interest in the particulars of the subject. The latter was addressed to senior level officials, but presumably would also serve those with only peripheral interest in the subject and those without exotic clearances.

There is no consistent Community policy regarding the use of footnotes in finished intelligence, but there are at least three arguments favoring the practice. First, it helps to maintain substantive continuity and an analytic memory. Second, it reassures readers that there is indeed some basis for the analyst's judgments other than whim or intuition. Some readers, even at the highest levels, occasionally feel the need for that kind of reassurance.\*\*

\* [redacted] "Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," OPR III, and PR 75-III, August 1975.

\*\*For example, in the case of a recent joint OPR/OSR/SALT Support Staff paper ("SALT and Soviet Decision-Making: Institutions and Actors," OPR 114, [redacted] December 1975, TOP SECRET CODEWORD) published without footnotes, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Ellsworth requested the CIA authors to provide as much as possible of the raw data and other finished intelligence used in preparing the paper. The authors [redacted] accordingly forwarded annotated copies of the study with attachments containing excerpts from the sources used. The requestors formally commended them for their timely and effective response.

Another reason for listing source citations is that it helps to measure (and demonstrate) the contribution of intelligence information. A piece of conventional wisdom among critics of the Intelligence Community has it that a clever journalist or a diligent academician can track all important political developments on, say, the Soviet scene as well as or better than an intelligence analyst. But the source citations in this OPR study suggest that the journalist or academician operates at a disadvantage. Of the 137 footnotes to the study, 28 consist of references solely to classified intelligence information (e.g., clandestine reports) and another 14 to unclassified information from Intelligence Community sources (FBIS-type information or analysis); 12 other footnotes are a mix of intelligence and open (academic or journalistic) sources. The other 83 reflect information presumably available to any academician or journalist—but of course also available to the intelligence analyst.

Moreover, in the present instance the information collected by the Community imparts a special quality to the study by showing more "cutting edges" to the issue itself, Ukrainian nationalism, than would otherwise be apparent. Because of intelligence information we have several singular illustrations of the nationalistic behavior of the former Republic Party leader, Petr Shelest. We learn, for example, that Shelest and his subordinates protected some Ukrainian dissidents on various occasions, that Shelest tolerated his own son's association with Ukrainian dissident intellectuals, that Shelest instructed Ukrainian media to play up Ukrainian economic achievements and downgrade those of the USSR as a whole. We also learn that Shelest's own book glorified the Ukraine, and that the book apparently played a key role in the CPSU Politburo's decision to remove him in 1972.

Intelligence information used in this study also provides unique testimony to the broad

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connections of the Ukrainian dissidents. It shows, inter alia, the existence of inter-city links and the close collaboration of the influential Russian dissident Andrey Sakharov with the Ukrainian dissident Ivan Svitlichny. And it shows that most of the dissidents recognized allies in the Ukrainian Communist Party organization. Indeed, many gave Shelest strong moral support in his confrontation with Moscow because he seemed in their eyes to be upholding Ukrainian nationalism.

At the same time, the intelligence information illustrates the depth of concern felt by the authorities at this upsurge of national feeling in the Ukraine. There seemed to be genuine apprehension among some Soviet leaders that the Ukraine was vulnerable to separatist propaganda, even that emanating from Peking. And CPSU leaders apparently went to such pains to discredit Shelest after his removal that they circulated stories heaping all the blame upon him for the 1968 decision to invade Czechoslovakia—a deliberate distortion of Shelest's complex and ambivalent motivations during that crisis.

The paper concludes that nationalism in the Ukraine is "growing," or at least becoming "more vocal." Contrary to the initial judgments of the Intelligence Community (but even more contrary to the judgments of Western media), the study indicates that Shelest's Ukrainian nationalism was at least as important a factor in his removal as his opposition to detente. And contrary to what is inferred in open, non-intelligence sources about Shelest's successor, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who otherwise seems to be a vigorous foe of Ukrainian nationalism, this study indicates that under certain circumstances (but only after Brezhnev's departure), he too might find it desirable or expedient to cater to local interests in an effort to strengthen his own power.\*

The author of the study reports that she has received no reaction from policy-level consumers, but that several analysts have

\*Some of these indications appear in this August 1975 report. More are addressed and analyzed in greater detail in a subsequent study by the same author, "The Political Prospects of Vladimir Shcherbitsky," PR 76 10019, February 1976, SECRET.

commented on it. One can speculate about possible reasons for the lack of high level response. First, the study was self-initiated, rather than aimed at meeting a specific request. Second, many high level policy makers feel they do not have the time to read even an executive summary unless the subject is directly and explicitly related to their current concerns. In the case of another recent OPR paper, "Changing Soviet Perceptions of World Politics and the USSR's International Role," also issued in two versions, we have learned that some high-level recipients of both versions did not find time to read either, even though the subject was of great importance and the DCI addressed a cover note to these particular recipients. Perhaps they felt, on the basis of its broad title, that the study was unlikely to serve their immediate needs.\*

At the October 1975 meeting of the NSCIC Working Group, one high-level consumer commented on the difficulty of inducing those in his position to read more intelligence products. His remarks were offered in the context of a discussion of two intelligence papers which he had read in preparation for the Working Group meeting and which he described as excellent.\*\* He said he normally preferred to read material rather than have it briefed to him, because he believed he could absorb information about three times as rapidly in this way. But, clearly, many consumers would rather be briefed. He then implied that he expected this circumstance to persist, almost regardless of how concisely and artfully intelligence papers were packaged.

\*The paper, written by [redacted] was published in October 1975 as OPR 113, SECRET [redacted] and PR-75-113M (the executive summary), CONFIDENTIAL. The cover note from the DCI, with the full study attached, was sent to selected recipients on 30 December. The paper was brought up for discussion (and generated some controversy) at USIB in January 1976. At least partly due to the discussion at USIB, the paper attracted numerous comments from other analysts and consumers below the top echelons.

\*\*The papers were: Lt. Col. Robert Fuller, USAF, "Soviet Support for Wars of Liberation," DIANM 2-75, 15 September 1975, SECRET/ [redacted] "Chinese Politics and the Sino-Soviet-US Triangle," OPR 404, SC 03846/75, August 1975, TOP SECRET [redacted]

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## The Collection Community

### *Focus*

#### *A Program for Intelligence Community Review of Reporting By Human Resources From United States Overseas Missions*

Since late 1974, the young NFIB Human Sources Committee has conducted a program of assessing reporting from US overseas missions. This enterprise, which came to be called the FOCUS Review Program, has made a number of contributions to the improvement of reporting from US representatives abroad.

It was Mr. Colby who first advanced the notion that the Community should develop a means of systematically evaluating the quality of human source reporting. In his initial Letter of Instruction to the Chairman of the Human Sources Committee (since renamed the Human Resources Committee), he expressed his objective of providing Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions "a regular and candid appraisal of the performance of his mission, viewed from (the DCI) perspective, and with appropriate comments as to the future." The HSC was thus given the task of developing an assessment mechanism to provide frank appraisals of overseas reporting on a regular basis.

Mr. Colby saw the program as permitting a constructive dialogue between himself, or other Community principals, and senior foreign affairs representatives overseas. Generally, the Intelligence Community leadership recognized the advantages of providing "feedback" to collectors and other information gatherers in embassies; but, nearly all agencies entered the program with institutional reservations about having outsiders evaluate the reporting of "their man in Calcutta." The major participants (State, DIA, CIA, Treasury, ERDA and the military services) now seem reasonably comfortable with the FOCUS program and regard it as a useful Community activity.

### *Procedures*

From the outset, the Human Sources Committee recognized the need for major assistance from the substantive side of the Community. An approach was made to the National Intelligence Officers to assist in the effort. Although there were a few misgivings about value versus effort required for this program, the NIOs recommended a slate of countries for FOCUS reviews and then chaired a series of assessment seminars. These assessment seminars varied greatly in form and, often, content.

Differing perceptions caused procedures to develop slowly. Clearly, assessments would define reporting problems, but how should the Community address these problems and then set about to solve them?

Gradually, the FOCUS Review developed into a two-phase process. Part I assesses the substance of reporting from a diplomatic mission, i.e., its adequacy and timeliness and its responsiveness to the needs of consumers within and without the Intelligence Community. Reporting Assessments are written by the appropriate National Intelligence Officer on the basis of interagency seminars in which both policy and intelligence officers participate. All human source reporting is examined, usually by category (political, military, economic, etc.), though emphasis is on overt collection. Provision is made for dissenting views to be recorded.

Part II, the Action Review, examines reporting problems and opportunities arising out of the Reporting Assessment and recommends follow-up action. Its objective is to suggest ways of improving coordination at the Washington level and to provide information designed to assist Ambassadors in their supervision of field reporting programs and resources under NSCID 2. The Action Review is based on the Committee's discussion of written comments provided by Washington reporting managers

and an examination of the Reporting Assessment.

### Some Highlights

The first FOCUS assessment was conducted on Peru in the fall of 1974. Since then, there have been FOCUS Reviews of reporting from embassies in [redacted]

[redacted] With 13 reviews completed, four more are underway: [redacted]. Current planning calls for a continuing program of 12 to 15 assessments per year.

More people initially involved in the FOCUS program in Washington considered it worthwhile. Analysts, especially, were quick to see merit in meeting to review the adequacy of reporting.

*A fringe benefit of the FOCUS process was the interaction that occurred between analysts working on Ethiopia . . . Ideas were shared, references to specific reporting exchanged, and a better understanding of individual interest and responsibilities noted . . . similar meetings on a yearly or semiannual basis would be productive (from the FOCUS Ethiopia report, 7 January 1975).*

FOCUS [redacted] October 1975, was more complex than most and required two assessment reports, one on economics and technology, another on political and military reporting. Findings and judgments expressed in Reporting Assessments can be both general and specific. Typical of general findings is this comment on political reporting:

*There is general consensus that the embassy is performing well in meeting its responsibilities for reporting on political affairs, despite a reduction of some [redacted] percent in the number of reporting officers over the past 12 years. This reduction has, nonetheless, imposed constraints on the embassy's ability to collect and report. Reporting on [redacted] foreign policy, in particular, has suffered somewhat because of these constraints, and there are signs that domestic reporting may be starting to suffer as well.*

A specific finding from the same study is also illustrative:

*Gaps remain in our knowledge of [redacted] military matters. These include specific information on defense expenditures, logistic capabilities, stockpiles for conventional war, and plans to restructure the [redacted]*

The DCI frequently sends a letter to the appropriate Chief of Mission after a FOCUS Review is completed. Mr. Colby liked to highlight excellent performance as well as to address difficulties. In his letter accompanying FOCUS [redacted] for example, Mr. Colby commented to [redacted]

Analysts are nearly unanimous in their hunger for special reporting from representatives of all government departments abroad. Mr. Colby highlighted this in FOCUS [redacted] by saying it could be most helpful if some suitable way could be found to provide Washington useful information that may be accumulated by AID and USIA officers in [redacted] Often these officers have unique insight regarding a country; reports from field trips into the provinces would be especially useful.


FOCUS [redacted] identified the possibilities of security assistance organizations (MAAGs and Military Missions) in providing special insights in host country military establishments.

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In the follow-up to FOCUS [redacted] a number of steps were taken by various parts of the Defense Department to encourage better use of these opportunities.

Occasionally, a FOCUS judgment may simplify the task of collectors in the field. The CIA station in [redacted] was happy to have the following view expressed in FOCUS [redacted]



### Accomplishments and Problems

These extracts provide some of the flavor of the FOCUS Review Program. It seems fairly well established that FOCUS has provided a number of benefits to the Intelligence Community in Washington and to its representatives overseas. Among these are:

- Information gatherers and intelligence collectors in the field are learning that "the people in Washington" depend on them and take their reporting seriously.
- A number of guidance, collection, and communications problems have been identified for improvement.
- National intelligence officers, analysts, and collection managers have reinforced their efforts to improve interdepartmental relationships and facilitate cooperative actions.
- Washington policy officers and major consumers are becoming more involved in important aspects of the intelligence function. They are meeting with intelligence representatives, analysts, and collection managers to discuss their intelligence needs.

On the other hand, the FOCUS Review process has some deficiencies:

- The selection of overseas missions for FOCUS Review seems to have been guided to a degree by convenience rather than need. Understandably, the less complex overseas missions were examined in the first series of reviews as a learning experience. It seems desirable now to focus on those missions where particular problems exist and those missions whose reporting is most vital to national intelligence.
- The evaluation of human resource reporting under FOCUS is sometimes incomplete. For many diplomatic posts, other collectors, such as third-country reporting and SIGINT, are a factor affecting reporting by the mission.
- It is difficult to move from problem identification to problem solving. This is true of FOCUS: the follow-up phase of the FOCUS Review procedure is its weakest aspect.


Recent guidance from the President contained in Executive Order 11905, 18 February 1976, identified evaluation as a key function for the Intelligence Community:

*The National Security Council shall conduct a semi-annual review . . . . These reviews shall consider the needs of users of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of intelligence products . . . .*

The Director of Central Intelligence shall . . .

*Consult with users and producers of intelligence, including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Resources and Development Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the timeliness, relevancy, and quality of the intelligence product.*

FOCUS is a new program. But it promises to provide an increasingly useful means for evaluating human resources reporting, and it could serve as a model for reviewing the effectiveness of other national collection efforts as well.



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## The Warning Problem

### *Mayaguez Revisited*

In its post-mortem examination of the Mayaguez crisis, the Intelligence Community Staff identified certain problems and deficiencies adversely affecting the Community's performance during that crisis and made specific recommendations to correct them.\* Actions taken since then—either in direct response to those recommendations or, indirectly, as a result of the impetus provided by the Mayaguez incident—are summarized below.

**Post-Mortem Recommendation.** *The Community should establish effective communications channels with all elements of the Government that are from time to time involved in crisis monitoring and management. Specifically, it should maintain contacts with systems that issue warning to merchant marine vessels and commercial aircraft.*

#### **Actions Taken:**

—Under the direction of an interagency ad hoc group, a number of special and improved procedures and systems were developed for providing warnings to U.S. flag ships and aircraft. These include the development of a U.S. Flag Merchant Vessel Locator Filing System, maintained by the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center, to provide reporting of port arrivals/departures and the at-sea positions of all US flag merchant ships engaged in international trade; and implementation of new procedures to ensure that upon issuance by the Defense Mapping Agency of a special warning to U.S. ships, the Maritime Administration also notifies shipping owners and operators so that these companies may issue alerts on their communications facilities. These and other measures constitute the first effective means

\*Post-Mortem Report, "An Examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance Before and During the Mayaguez Incident of May 1975" (TOP SECRET, [redacted]) published August 1975.

of linking the Intelligence Community's warning apparatus with those other U.S. departments and agencies, such as the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, the Defense Mapping Agency's Hydrographic Center, and State Department's Office of Maritime Affairs, which share responsibility for air and marine safety.

—At the request of the IC Staff, the NSC Staff asked each government agency to furnish information on the functions of any watch/operations centers it maintains here and abroad. The results of this survey are now being compiled into a directory which should improve communications between all concerned government elements, including those which normally have no need to communicate with each other but which might have to do so under crisis conditions.

**Post-Mortem Recommendation.** *Existing procedures for handling critical intelligence should be revised and clarified so as to ensure appropriate action on the part of the various watch and operations centers, to make certain that individual [redacted] messages are disseminated simultaneously to appropriate addressees, and, in general, to clarify other aspects of the system's procedures.*

#### **Actions Taken:**

—A revised and expanded version of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID 7/1) concerning the "Handling of Critical Information" was prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff and approved by USIB in December 1975. This Directive defines critical information as information concerning foreign situations or developments which affect the security or national interests of the US to such an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the President or other members of the NSC. The DCID clarified and improved the procedures governing the

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recognition of critical developments abroad, the transmission of information on those developments to appropriate operations centers in the Washington area, and the passage of that information to senior officers of the Government.

- A new document—the “Handbook of Standard Operating Procedures for the Reporting of Critical Information”—was developed by the Intelligence Community Staff in conjunction with the Departments of Defense and State and the principal USIB member agencies. This document expands on the material presented in DCID 7/1, spells out in some detail the proper procedures for handling so-called [ ] messages (those messages which contain critical information and which are handled on a highest-priority basis), and provides guidelines and instructions applicable to all elements of the government concerned. The Handbook was approved by USIB and has been published as an Attachment to DCID 7/1. A condensed, unclassified version of these [ ] procedures has also been prepared and given wide dissemination throughout the U.S. Government.

*Post-Mortem Recommendation. Certain standard operating procedures of the various Washington area watch and operations centers should be revised to establish a set of common Community-wide standards.*

#### Actions Taken:

- USIB has approved revised operating procedures for the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network (NOIWON), the system designed to provide for simultaneous conferencing and exchange of information among the seven key watch centers in the Washington area. The new procedures now require that the NOIWON be activated upon receipt of a [ ] or other alert advisory.
- CONTEXT (Conference Text Editing)—a unique computerized system combining secure voice and a visual text capability in a remote conferencing mode—is expected to become operational in 1976 with terminals

at CIA, NSA, DIA, and State. The system will facilitate the analysts' preparation of time-critical intelligence products, such as crisis situation reports, and will also permit emergency meetings (including those at the NFIB, formerly USIB, level) to be convened in a remote conferencing mode. CONTEXT will eventually be enhanced by a remote display capability that will allow presentation of maps and other visual displays at each location.

*Post-Mortem Recommendation. The flexibility of technical collection systems, such as satellite photography, should be increased so as to permit more rapid and more effective ways of acquiring information during rapidly breaking crises.*

#### Actions Taken:

- Planning has largely been completed to make maximum use during crises of new technical collection systems. For example, under the direction of the NFIB Committee for Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), a new staff (manned on a 24-hour basis by DOD and CIA personnel) will provide the means for rapidly tasking new imagery collection systems and disseminating the results.
- Similarly, special new procedures were implemented by the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee of the SIGINT Committee of NFIB to ensure rapid redirection of SIGINT satellites during crisis situations. The new procedures permit any NFIB agency to task the SIGINT satellite operators directly via high precedence message in times of crisis.
- The Defense Department's Collection Coordination Facility, which is expected to become operational late this year, will permit consolidation of DOD time-sensitive requirements and more efficient tasking of technical collection systems.

*Post-Mortem Recommendation. Contacts between the operational and intelligence communities should become more frequent and open, especially at the working level. The*

*responsibility for developing a better way of exchanging appropriate information should rest in the first instance with the Intelligence Community, especially the Intelligence Community Staff and the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs).*

#### **Actions Taken:**

- The Intelligence Community Staff has inaugurated semi-annual conferences of the heads of Community and non-Community operations/intelligence centers to encourage closer cooperation among operational and intelligence elements and to discuss and resolve matters and problems of mutual concern. Three such conferences have been held since the Mayaguez incident and a fourth is planned for late 1976.
- The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) convene frequent interagency meetings of working-level analysts, collectors, and policy or operationally oriented officers to ensure that they all are familiar with current problems and activities affecting their areas of responsibility. These meetings provide an opportunity for wide-ranging, frank discussions of problems facing the policy maker and the Intelligence Community and serve to improve the Community's posture in times of crisis.
- The Pacific Command has established in Korea an all-source "fusion center"—which seeks to combine both operations and intelligence functions in one location—to provide more effective support to Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, especially during crises. This center collocates J2 (intelligence) and J3 (operations) personnel and provides for the immediate use of information on US and allied force operational data in the intelligence and warning process.
- Modernization of the National Military Indications Center (NMIC) and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) facilities will, when completed, allow for much closer coordination between the operational and intelligence functions of the military and permit them to provide more effective support to national authorities.

- Other measures—such as the development of the previously mentioned CONTEXT and NOIWON systems—will also contribute to effective exchanges of information between the operational and intelligence communities.

***Post-Mortem Recommendation.** The way in which the Community issues warnings of impending developments to NSC members and other national consumers should be improved. The Alert Memoranda system should be refined and become the firmly established Community vehicle for alerting top-level consumers to the existence of potentially serious threats (other than strategic threats) to US interests.*

#### **Actions Taken:**

- At the DCI's request, the Intelligence Community Staff prepared a comprehensive study of intelligence Alert Memoranda, which concluded, inter alia, that these memoranda serve as effective instruments of warning for decision makers.
- Revised procedures defining the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officers and other elements of the Community for the preparation, coordination, and issuance of intelligence Alert Memoranda were approved by USIB on 15 December 1975.
- The NIOs are reviewing Alert Memoranda procedures to ascertain what improvements are feasible without inhibiting the vehicle's flexibility and capacity for quick response. One improvement (now implemented) provides for the automatic notification of appropriate US Ambassadors that an Alert Memorandum is being prepared and asks for their comments by a stated deadline.
- Within the Defense Department, Alert Memorandum distribution procedures have been revised to ensure more rapid delivery to key policy makers.

| R O N I |

### III. Staff Study

#### *A Survey of the Community's Use of New Analytical Methods*

This paper, prepared by [redacted] is based on discussions with analysts throughout the Community who are now involved in the development of new methods, on written precis of their work which some analysts provided, and on a summary of its efforts in this field by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence ("Progress on New Methodologies in the DDI," 21 August 1974).

#### The Promise of New Techniques

New analytical methods should enhance analysis in several ways.\* When they are appropriately used, they demand explicit expression of subjective judgments, which are then more readily weighed and amended. Where information can, without distortion, be expressed numerically, these methods permit greater precision and the systematic consideration of a great many more influences on an event than would be possible without them.

New problems may require the revision of previously useful approaches and the creation of original ones. New sources of intelligence may demand new methods of interpretation and analysis, particularly if the sources are prolific and are to be exploited fully. But perhaps the most important, if not the most obvious, fruit of the development of these new methods is the

\*"New analytical methods" is a notoriously imprecise term, one that has at times been applied without much discrimination to techniques that are neither new nor, strictly, analytical. This article compromises with that imprecision. While indeed analytical, most of the methods surveyed here have been used for some time by political scientists, economists, and business managers. Thus their novelty is confined, with a few important exceptions, to their application to intelligence.

opportunity it provides to step away from the actual work of analysis and examine the assumptions which have guided it.

Still, the belief that all or even most of the many new techniques developed for, say, political analysis can be successfully adapted to intelligence is unfounded. Many such methods demand a great deal more information than is normally accorded analysts. Moreover, while not all new techniques are quantitative ones, many are, and some issues simply do not lend themselves to numerical treatment. And even when a new analytical method might in principle be applied to intelligence, it may be that it is unnecessary or unwise to do so. Unnecessary because, in many instances, conventional forms of analysis will be quite sufficient. Unwise, because the particular method may require more time or more specialized analytical skills than an office can be expected to provide (and sometimes more sophistication and more patience than readers can be expected to bring to bear).

What follows is a survey of the development, the adaptation and, in some instances, the already routine use of new analytical methods by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence Research of the Department of State.\*


\*Although the National Security Agency has devised sophisticated methods for using computers in the analysis of signals intelligence, it is not experimenting with the kinds of analytical methods that are treated here. Further, since this is a Community survey, no mention is made of the very important work of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

## THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

### Office of Current Intelligence

The Office of Current Intelligence has charged its Methods and Technology Staff with acquainting analysts in OCI with new analytical methods. The Staff encourages the use of those qualitative and quantitative techniques which its own studies suggest are applicable to intelligence.

As part of its educational work, the Staff publishes a newsletter, *Notes on Methodology*, each issue of which describes the basic principles and possible uses of a promising technique. Some of the articles have treated specific analytical problems for whose solution novel methods have proven useful. The Staff has also published a comprehensive *Glossary of Terms and Techniques for Political Analysis*, a unique and particularly helpful guide through the sometimes obscure language of these methods.


The Methods and Technology Staff also assists in applying new analytical methods to current problems. The Staff's primary intention in this respect is to tailor new methods and new ways of presenting analysis to the particular demands of current intelligence. The Staff emphasizes approaches which do not require lengthy preparation, specialized data, or the extensive use of computers. The fruits of this emphasis include a multi-attribute utility analysis of the Panama Canal negotiations, a comparative analysis of the membership of the Chinese Central Committee elected at the Tenth Party Congress with the Central Committees elected at the Eighth and Ninth Congresses, a study of the  electoral system, a decision tree analysis to evaluate the effects of the Philippine insurgency on President Marcos' political standing, and a model for predicting and analyzing the results of elections.

### Office of Political Research

The Analytical Techniques Group (ATG) within the Office of Political Research is responsible for the application of novel, frequently statistical approaches to the analysis of political intelligence. Its work includes the adaptation of existing techniques used in

universities and private industry, as well as the creation of new techniques and arrangements to suit the unique needs of intelligence production.

The following list of projects illustrates the scope of OPR's work in these new methods:



### Office of Strategic Research

The Office of Strategic Research has for some time used quantitative techniques in describing and estimating the size, quality, deployment and costs of foreign military forces and weapons. Its Resources and Requirements Staff is specifically responsible for encouraging and supervising the trial and adoption of new methods.

The Strategic Evaluation Center of OSR has used statistical measures and quantitative analyses in its comparison of US, Soviet and Chinese strategic forces. The Center has also made its studies of strategic conflict more rigorous and comprehensive by employing models of the interaction of forces; it would, in fact, be difficult to estimate the course of such engagements without the benefit of models. The Center has drawn up a detailed program for the refinement of existing methods and for the development of new ones, a program in which OSR will be assisted by ORD.

Other divisions in OSR have also bent new methods to their work. The Theater Forces Division, for example, is exploring new ways of studying and predicting the results of an air campaign in Central Europe. Working with the Office of Joint Computer Support, the Division has, in Project Tacos, prepared as part of this exploration a model for assessing the capabilities of Soviet air defense forces. With ORD, the Division has obtained the assistance of the [ ] [ ] in devising new approaches to the analysis of the various influences on the course of tactical air campaigns.

In addition, appraisals by the Theater Forces and Eastern Forces Divisions of the conventional forces of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, NATO, the Mideast, and China rely on order-of-battle data which is stored in a data management system called [ ] This system, which is still under evaluation, will contain basic data on the number, location and readiness of ground force units and may, at some future time, be expanded to include data on air and naval forces as well.

The Soviet Strategic Forces Division has applied new techniques to its analysis of Soviet strategic missile, naval and bomber forces. This Division's Strategic Attack Branch is using

sophisticated statistical methods for drawing inferences about the degree of certainty that can be attributed to information gained from photography. This Division is also investigating the use of a model for assessing the effectiveness of Soviet *strategic* air defenses.

The Programs Analysis Division has for years used a complex data management model (SCAM I, Strategic Cost Analysis Model) to produce ruble and dollar estimates of Soviet defense spending. To develop inputs for this system and conduct related research, new analytical and quantitative models have been applied to produce better ruble and dollar weapon system costs and to explore the direct costing of Soviet research and development efforts. A second generation, greatly expanded model—SCAM II—is now being tested and should be operational within one year. In addition, the Eastern Forces Division has employed quantitative techniques to assign costs in dollars to certain pieces of Chinese equipment and has conducted research on ratios of the dollar to the yuan for various classes of military products.

### Office of Economic Research

The Office of Economic Research has long used a variety of quantitative techniques in its analysis. Such methods are of course more readily applied to economic data than to information about, say, politics, and indeed economists have made sophisticated statistical descriptions and mathematical models an expected feature of their work.

Still, such methods are often designed for the study of problems on which a great deal more information is available than is often true of issues in economic intelligence. The Office must accordingly evaluate these methods for their usefulness to intelligence and then frequently modify them. In 1968, the Office established the Systems Development Staff (recently made part of the Development and Analysis Center) to oversee this modification and adaptation of established methods to economic intelligence and to experiment with new ones as well.

OER routinely uses established econometric models in its work. In the last several years, the Office has made effective use of models in its

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analysis of the international oil market—of oil prices, of the rates at which oil is produced, and of the trade in oil and the payments for it.

Efforts by OER to develop its own new approaches have also been fruitful. One project employs econometric techniques to predict the grain production in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In another project, a model for forecasting international trade flows has been devised with the assistance of ORD. The Office has developed new ways to approach a number of other problems, such as the prospects for Chinese industrial production and the possibility of increases in Soviet defense spending.

#### Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research

The Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research (OGCR) is pursuing a number of programs in which new methods are being tested and then applied to the Office's special analytical concerns. Supervising the application of new techniques is the responsibility of a special assistant to the Director.

With the assistance of academic and industrial consultants, the Office has developed new methods for exploiting satellite photography.




The Cartography Division's accomplishments in developing automated cartographic systems should be noted for they do permit the manipulation as well as the storage and presentation of information. "Automap" is one such system for producing maps that has become an important analytical tool. It draws on cartographic information stored in digital form in "World Data Bank I and II," computer files developed by OGCR.

#### Office of Research and Development

In 1973, the Office of Research and Development established the Center for the Development of Analytical Methodology (CDAM). The Center is responsible for devising new methods of analysis and adapting both these original techniques and pertinent existing ones to the purposes of intelligence. The members of the Center's staff have backgrounds in various fields and are thus able to work closely with analysts throughout CIA.

Although most of CDAM's work is in the areas of science and technology, it has also contributed to the development of new methods for economic and for political research. The Center assisted, for example, in devising a method for assessing the accuracy of statistics on the world's petroleum resources. An econometric model of international trade that deals with the trade accounts, balance of payments and foreign exchange rates was constructed in cooperation with OER and is now in use in that office. The



#### Analytical Support Center

The Center for the Development of Analytical Methodology also supervises the work of the Analytical Support Center. Established in November 1974 and sponsored by CIA, the Intelligence Community Staff and ARPA, the Analytical Support Center was created to permit analysts to experiment with new analytical methods which hold some promise of directly assisting them in their work.

The Center has worked on: the development and application of analytical techniques for the study of foreign elites; the processes by which foreign governments make and implement decisions, especially during crises; the dynamics of the arms race; international negotiations; and the succession in various countries to national leadership.

## THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

### Directorate of Intelligence

The Directorate of Intelligence uses several mathematical models in its analysis of the forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The Navy Branch of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Area Division uses a model that aids in judging the effectiveness of Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Another office in this division, the Military Geography and Movement Branch, is using a computer simulation model, [redacted]

DIA25X1 [redacted] to study the ability of the Warsaw Pact to transport supplies. The model can be applied to any transportation network for which a study of the movement of, for instance, munitions is sought. Analysts in DIA are now combining features of a file of logistical data with the [redacted] and are considering a similar connection of the model with a file on ground order of battle. Such improvements will permit detailed analysis of the ability of the Warsaw Pact to move men as well as supplies.

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### Directorate of Estimates

The Long Range Forecasting Division of this Directorate has among its responsibilities that of encouraging the application of new analytical methods. To this end, the Division answers specific requests for help from analysts in the Directorate of Estimates, primarily by demonstrating the methods, statistical programs, and files that can, without unacceptable costs or delay, be applied to the analysts' concerns.

The Directorate is presently using a number of analytical methods and programs, developed in some cases with the assistance of contractors, in some cases independently.

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[redacted] are models for studying the engagement of missiles with radars and ABMs and for predicting the damage the missiles would cause. The first model, [redacted] is designed for the study of ICBMs and SLBMs and has been used in several ways: in

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investigations of the usefulness of ABMs; in studies for use at the SALT negotiations; and in analyses of target coverage, launch techniques, and the probability of survival, under different conditions, of SLBMs. [redacted] is a model with many of the same features but is used in the study of the effectiveness of foreign cruise missiles. It has been applied to the analysis of advanced air-to-surface missiles and to the study of naval exercises.

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Several arsenal exchange models are also in use in the Directorate of Estimates. In one, known simply as [redacted] mathematical programming techniques are used to determine the most effective allocation of strategic missiles against targets. Also used in the Directorate of Estimates is a specialized model of arsenal exchanges designed by CIA, which employs the model as well.

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The Support Center of the National Military Command System has designed a model for estimating the immediate effects—fallout and blast—of nuclear weapons. This, [redacted] has been used extensively in war games, and in the preparation of Defense Intelligence Estimates.

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## THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research has in the last few years commissioned several studies to determine the usefulness of quantitative techniques for research in foreign affairs.

The most ambitious, Project Quest, was conducted by PRINCE Analysis, Inc., under a contract with the Bureau's Office of External Research. The study attempts to offer a systematic answer to the question of the usefulness of new analytical methods.

The authors wished to discover whether it was possible and desirable to use in the work of the Department of State the frequently quantitative methods employed by academic students of comparative politics and international affairs.

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They concluded that analysts in the Department use quantitative techniques infrequently and in thoroughly traditional ways; that they make predictions that are concerned with the immediate future or which fail to specify the period to which they apply; and that their concerns are considerably broader and more complex than those of their academic counterparts.

While existing quantitative research thus appeared to offer little assistance to the considerably more demanding work of INR's analysts, it still seemed possible that particular quantitative techniques might bring greater rigor and precision to bear on specific analytical problems. The authors devised six case studies to see whether this was so, choosing topics which were pertinent to the work of INR's analysts and which lent themselves to treatment by one or more quantitative methods.

The case studies suggested that certain techniques could assist analysts in some but by no means all aspects of their work. For what the

authors called "information gathering," some quantitative methods were found to be useful.

The quantitative methods used in the case studies were less useful for explaining events—for "testing assumptions and hypotheses"—primarily because of the great variety of influences that an analyst must consider. The authors concluded that the final activity into which they divided the work of an analyst, forecasting, might at times benefit from the use of such methods as correlation techniques, trend analysis, and the Delphi technique.

INR has commissioned other studies similarly aimed not at applying an analytical method to a particular issue but at determining more generally whether new techniques will further the Bureau's work and, if so, how they should be used. One such paper written for INR by Lincoln Bloomfield of MIT's Center for International Studies, reviewed the recent literature of the social sciences, particularly that concerning the development of theoretical structures to guide analysis, for the value of this work to the improvement of the policy process. [REDACTED]

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## IV. Special Article

### *CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security Policy Making*

*The following is a synopsis of the findings and principal recommendations of the January 1976 report of the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) concerning intelligence support of foreign policy. The CSI study team perused relevant literature and discussed the subject with numerous CIA and policy officials, but the report is not intended as a definitive statement of the Agency's position. Rather, it is intended to stimulate thought and discussion, both on the conclusions themselves and on their broader implications for the role of intelligence in the policy making process. Though dealing specifically with the CIA's role, the paper's conclusions in many instances apply to the Intelligence Community as a whole. Readers' comments are invited and may be addressed to [redacted] Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1036 Chamber of Commerce Building, Arlington, Va. (351-2193).*

I. The dividing line that in traditional theory separates intelligence and policy has become obscure. Intelligence feeds into the policy making process in a wide variety of forms and at many different levels. A significant part of the intelligence message conveyed to top policy makers is unidentifiably imbedded in policy papers or inextricably interwoven in sets of options. The tendency of intelligence and policy to become intertwined early in the decision-making process has intensified in recent years.

#### Recommendations

*To increase intelligence producers' specific understanding of the policy making process: summaries of theoretical work on decision making, organizational dynamics, and psychological factors should be distributed to analysts and supervisors on a regular basis by an individual with full-time responsibility for that task; Agency training courses should place more*

*emphasis on the subject; Agency officers should serve in policy-related slots whenever possible and share their perspectives with other intelligence producers in appropriate forums.*

II. The widespread use of human filtering mechanisms on the consumer side results in the failure of much written intelligence meant for high-level policy makers to reach them in its original format and in the appropriate context. CIA intelligence sometimes becomes just another anonymous bit of information, and even when particular intelligence documents are forwarded, principals often read only summaries written and attached by their aides. Policy makers, moreover, take aboard copious quantities of so-called unfinished intelligence. They prefer to get raw items of current import immediately, rather than to wait even a few hours for the raw factual report to be accompanied by interpretation. The problem here is that the policy staffers' compilations of such data may not be sound or consistent in their use of intelligence information. And they may not accurately reflect the originator's view of what should be brought to the policy makers' attention.

#### Recommendations

*To increase the impact of the Agency's products and services on the policy making readership: executive summaries should precede all memoranda; a paper should identify the implications of the issue for the US; alternative interpretations should be presented, as should be speculation (clearly labelled as such); a new product should be considered—a "Morning Briefing Notes," electrically disseminated, providing informal, non-coordinated summaries and comments on significant overnight traffic, such as State and Defense cables, DDO reports, intercepts and press, not accounted for in the NID.*

III. A great deal of important intelligence is transmitted orally, through both formal, prepared briefings and informal exchanges. Discussions that DDO Division Chiefs have with Assistant Secretaries of State and NSC Staff members should be widely recognized within the CIA as constituting important, though informal, avenues for the passing of substantive intelligence and feedback on policy needs for intelligence. The strong natural linkages between the DDO and certain policy makers probably could be exploited in the overall intelligence support process more effectively than at present.

#### Recommendation

*To improve the substantive analyst's access to informally exchanged intelligence information and to the DDO officer's useful insights on the policy milieu and the policy maker's requirements, there should be regular meetings for this purpose between DDO Division Chiefs, representatives from DDI production offices, and the NIOs.*

IV. Policy makers value the Agency's products and services, but they tend to like some kinds of intelligence more than others. They most appreciate receiving unique pieces of information of the kind only intelligence sources can provide. Analysis of unfamiliar or particularly complex material is also coveted; the Agency's work on technical/scientific and military/strategic subjects is highly regarded, and economic analysis is enthusiastically received by those who specialize in the economic field. There is less admiration for the kinds of intelligence that correspond to most policy makers' own expertise, e.g., interpretive reporting on foreign political developments. In the areas of their own competence, policy makers tend to look to intelligence for the "facts," and they profess to regard much of the Agency's interpretive work as of marginal utility. They do, however, appreciate political analysis that answers specific questions or performs a special service by using new techniques, exploiting unfamiliar materials, adopting an imaginative approach, or developing an unusual insight.

#### Recommendations

*To increase the policy maker's receptivity to the Agency's political interpretation and analysis, further study is needed of the efficacy of various methods—e.g., team approaches, cross-disciplinary training, structural reorganizations—which seek to foster truly integrated inter-disciplinary analysis. Political analysts (not just NIOs who specialize in political subjects) should be given the opportunity, encouragement, and incentive to take especially vigorous initiatives to develop and sustain personal relationships with consumers.*

V. Policy makers genuinely desire probing, in-depth analysis in all fields, and there is recognition that CIA has been gaining ground on this front. There is, however, little confidence in most predictive intelligence—whether the Agency's own or the formal estimates of the Intelligence Community. Policy makers seem to be less interested in estimative judgments *per se* than in the basis for them; i.e., the laying out of the forces at work, the possible turning points, and the leverage—or lack of it—that the US might have in determining the outcome.

#### Recommendation

*To improve predictive intelligence, there is need for serious study of just what a realistic estimative mission ought to be and of what resources should be devoted to it.*

VI. The perennial—and probably interminable—problems of insufficient feedback and secretiveness concerning policy plans hinder intelligence responsiveness and adversely affect intelligence quality. Moreover, while most policy makers are reasonably enthusiastic about receiving intelligence, they are continually distracted from even reading it, let alone commenting on it, by the pressures of day-to-day operational matters and the urgent demands that non-intelligence people, paper, and problems levy upon their time and energy. Since we take as given that these problems will never disappear, initiatives for improved relationships must come

largely from the intelligence side. CIA must improve its capabilities to independently assess the questions the policy makers need answered now and to independently anticipate the problems they are likely to be faced with in the future.

#### Recommendations

*To increase communication with the policy maker: intelligence products should, to the extent feasible, be addressed to intended recipients by name; more products should be especially tailored for the mid-level*

*consumer—the policy staffer; producers in any case must make a greater effort to determine the intended audience before they begin to produce. Beyond this, consideration should be given to the establishment of broadly-based mechanisms—perhaps computer based—for improving intra-Agency awareness of ongoing policy support activities and for helping to make policy makers more aware of the full range of potentially relevant intelligence products and services; such mechanisms should serve as supplements to, rather than competitors with, the NIO system and the Key Intelligence Questions function.*

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## V. Correspondence

*The following letter was written in response to an item appearing in the RONI of June 1975. It addresses (eloquently, we think) a problem the Community faced in Vietnam—and still faces elsewhere—vis-a-vis the acquisition and production of objective intelligence on friendly forces and governments.*

Sirs:

As a more-or-less close observer of the agony of Indochina over the past 25 years, I feel compelled to offer an early comment on the "very preliminary look" at the Community's coverage during the final months in the June RONI (1975). Over the years, the Community generally has done a credible job of analyzing the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and likely courses of action of the Communists in Indochina than of the non-Communists. This was true in the French war in the early 50's, as well as in the 60's and 70's. Most of the "shock" developments throughout these three decades have been related to the *unanticipated* failures or deficiencies of the non-Communists—political and military—in coping with *foreseen* levels of Communist capabilities and pressures.

The only "real" surprise of the Diem Bien Phu campaign was the paralysis of the French command—and its loss of nerve—when confronted with the reality of the onslaught by Viet Minh forces whose strength and preparations had been assessed accurately and in detail by intelligence. The confident "let them come" challenge by the French on the eve of battle was replaced by shock and dismay when their artillery and air support proved ineffective in breaking up the expected Communist assaults.

The late 50's and early 60's were marked by misplaced confidence in the anticipated performance of Vietnamese military and security

forces against the well-defined and clearly growing Viet Cong threat.

The real "shock" of the Tet offensive stemmed primarily from exaggerated perceptions of the cumulative effects of the application of U.S. military power over the preceding two-and-a-half years, rather than from a lack of indications of an impending major enemy offensive.

In the final denouement, the surprise factor—as noted in RONI—was the collapse of ARVN (when the realization hit home at all levels that ARVN would no longer be supported in the manner to which it had become accustomed, i.e., the B-52's would never return), rather than the accurately assessed weight of enemy pressure.

This record clearly highlights a long-standing source of frustration to intelligence analysts and their consumers—that of making *net assessments* in "real-world" situations when inputs on one side of the equation are influenced by the subjective views and judgments of operating officials committed to the successful execution of policies, strategies and programs. Too often is the net judgment subverted or dominated by the overconfident and insistent views of operators and policy-makers concerning the "progress" achieved by friendly activities: The "success" of Operations *Atlante* and the expansion of the Vietnamese Army in 1953-54; the impact of U.S. training for ARVN in 1956-62; the effectiveness of U.S. search and destroy operations in 1965-67; the "success" of Vietnamization in 1973-75, *inter alia*.

Although the intelligence appraisals were often less than perfect, they were generally more pessimistic—or realistic—than the judgments of the operating officials. But the impartial intelligence appraisals were often discounted or ignored, or in some cases simply watered down,

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by the more subjective, optimistic—and influential—views of the operators.

Clearly, one lesson to be learned from our Indochina experience is the need to evolve a mechanism for providing the policy maker with truly objective net assessments in situations where the U.S. is operationally committed—a

mechanism that will effectively blend, if not balance, the voices of the *Pollyannas* with those of the *Cassandras*. The record of Indochina to the end shows that the influence of the *Pollyannas* was unduly prominent, to the detriment of the national interests of the U.S. and of the Vietnamese and American peoples.

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Imagery Analysis Service  
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